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SCALES OF DISCONNECTION: MISMATCHES SHAPING 
THE GEOGRAPHIES OF EMERGING ENERGY LANDSCAPES
Charles R. WARREN
Abstract
The networked nature of energy systems produces geographies of connection, but the focus of this paper is 
on geographies of disconnection, exploring the multi-scalar processes which shape the context in which energy 
landscapes emerge.  It does so, first, by presenting a case study of farmers’ attitudes to perennial energy crops in 
south-west Scotland.  Their strong antipathy to converting farmland to short-rotation coppice, and the reasons 
for their negative attitudes, exemplify some of the wider mismatches and disconnects which the paper goes on 
to discuss. These include socio-political and socio-cultural mismatches, and a range of essentially geographical 
disconnects which are scalar in nature, such as the familiar local-global tension and the mismatch between 
the scales (both temporal and spatial) at which environmental and human systems organise and function. 
The discussion shows how these disjunctions not only affect energy geographies but also raise far-reaching 
questions about the ability of current governance structures and liberal democratic systems to respond swiftly 
and effectively to global challenges.  The way that these mismatches are negotiated will mould both the character 
of future energy landscapes and the speed at which they take shape.
Shrnutí
Měřítka diskonekce: nesoulady ovlivňující geografie rozvíjejících se energetických krajin
Síťová podstata energetických systémů produkuje geografie spojitosti, nicméně tento článek se zaměřuje 
na geografie diskonekce, když zkoumá multiúrovňové procesy, které utváří kontext, v rámci něhož se rozvíjí 
energetické krajiny. Nejdříve je prezentována případová studie postojů zemědělců k víceletým energetickým 
plodinám v jihozápadním Skotsku. Jejich silný odpor k přeměně zemědělské půdy pro pěstování rychle rostoucích 
dřevin a důvody jejich negativních postojů ilustrují některé z obecnějších nesouladů a diskonekcí, které jsou 
v článku diskutovány. Tyto zahrnují sociopolitické a sociokulturní nesoulady a řadu v jádru geografických 
diskonekcí, které jsou z podstaty skalární, jako známé napětí mezi lokálním a globálním a nesoulad mezi 
měřítky (časovými i prostorovými), na kterých jsou postaveny a fungují environmentální a sociální systémy. 
Diskuze ukazuje, jak tyto disjunkce nejenom ovlivňují geografie energií, ale vyvolávají otázky schopnosti 
současných vládních struktur a liberálně-demokratických systémů rychle a účinně reagovat na globální výzvy. 
Způsob, jakým jsou tyto nesoulady řešeny, bude formovat charakter budoucích energetických krajiny, ale i 
rychlost, s jakou se budou rozvíjet.
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1. Introduction
Energy geographies now loom large within environmental 
management discourses, driven by the familiar ‘troika’ of 
climate change, energy security and peak oil, and by intense 
socio-political debates in many countries over the landscape 
impacts of renewable energy technologies (Warren et al., 2012). 
Even from this opening sentence it is immediately apparent 
that debates about energy geographies integrate numerous 
contentious and complex issues, all of which interconnect and 
interact on diverse spatial and temporal scales. They therefore 
constitute ‘wicked problems’ (Churchman, 1967), in that they 
resist resolution due to their complexity, they are multifaceted 
and interconnected, and large numbers of people and opinions 
are involved. Energy use has long been influential in the 
structuring of identities, territories and landscapes, and is 
likely to be the primary driver of landscape transformation 
in the present century (Nadai and van der Horst, 2010). 
Consequently, energy has emerged as a major governance 
challenge, not least because energy questions cross-cut many 
other policy concerns. Indeed, according to Zimmerer (2011, 
p. 705), energy is “far and away the most significant 
international resource system and political economic nexus”, 
and energy questions are fuelling “a general social-ecological 
crisis of now major proportions”.
This paper focuses on the essentially geographical 
dimension of this challenge by discussing the multiple scales – 
temporal and spatial – through which energy geographies are 
constructed, both conceptually and practically. It argues that 
a clearer recognition of this multiscalar reality can help us to 
understand why the debate is characterized by mismatches 
and disconnections, and why resolutions prove perennially 
elusive. In turn, this geographical framing may help to create 
discursive spaces for constructive debate.
In order to root these conceptual constructs in a real world 
context, the paper uses a case study about perennial energy 
crops to illustrate and exemplify how some of these issues 
play out in a specific geographic locale, namely south-west 
Scotland. Although the Scottish context is only one of many 
from which relevant examples could be drawn, it does provide 
a rich setting for exploring issues surrounding renewable 
energy and emerging energy landscapes (Warren, 2009). 
There are several reasons why this is so:
•	 the country is abundantly endowed with renewable energy 
potential, most notably in terms of hydro, wind (onshore 
and offshore) and marine renewables, but also in biomass;
•	 there is strong political will to harness this potential, 
demonstrated in the adoption of world-leading targets 
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(e.g. the aim of generating the equivalent of 100% of 
electricity demand from renewables by 2020). Scotland’s 
First Minister has said that he wants the country 
to become ‘the Saudi Arabia of renewable energy’ 
(Carrell, 2011);
•	 as a consequence of these first two points, recent years 
have seen dramatic rates of deployment, especially of 
onshore wind farms, accompanied by intense public 
debate and also by extensive research into social 
acceptance and the dynamics of opinion formation 
(Warren and Birnie, 2009; Aitken, 2010); and
•	 finally, several widely-debated issues come into especially 
sharp focus in the Scottish uplands, including: (i) the 
spatial coincidence of sites with power potential and 
internationally famous landscapes of high value for 
tourism, such as Loch Ness; (ii) landscape debates 
concerning the upgrading of energy grids required by 
new renewable generation capacity in peripheral areas; 
and (iii) the role of community ownership in facilitating 
the energy transition.
In this paper, I first outline a case study of energy crops 
and then shift to a much broader perspective, discussing 
wider questions about the disconnections which affect the 
geography of energy landscapes. Where appropriate, aspects 
of the case study are used to exemplify these broader issues. 
Recognising that one single case study could not effectively 
illustrate all the wide-ranging issues considered, however, 
the subsequent discussion draws on examples from other 
technologies and other regions.
2. Energy crops, bioenergy landscapes  
and farmers in south-west Scotland
Much of the public debate in Scotland surrounding 
renewable energy and landscape impacts has centred on the 
iconic landscapes of the Scottish Highlands, and has revolved 
around proposals for onshore windfarms, hydropower plants 
and grid upgrades (Warren, 2009). By contrast, the case 
study summarised here addresses perennial energy crops 
(PECs) in south-west Scotland, an energy source and a 
region which have received comparatively little attention. 
PECs have been actively promoted to Scottish farmers as 
a means of diversification during difficult economic times, 
and official projections envisage the conversion of large areas 
of farmland to PECs, both in Scotland and across the UK 
(DfT/DECC/DEFRA, 2012). The main policy drivers are the 
potential of such crops to produce a carbon-neutral fuel, 
while also offering a wide range of ecosystem services (Rowe 
et al., 2009). The combination of strong policy support and 
projections of large-scale expansion led Coleby et al. (2012, 
p. 374) to assert that energy crop production is “set to 
drive the most extensive changes in land-use in Britain 
since the 1950s”. If this prediction proves correct, the rapid 
creation of extensive bioenergy landscapes will represent a 
novel departure for UK energy geographies.
The reaction of the public to such a potential 
transformation in land use and landscapes, and the social 
acceptability of such changes, has begun to be investigated 
in recent years (Karp et al., 2009; Dockerty et al., 2012), but 
a necessary precondition of any large change taking place 
clearly would be the widespread adoption of PECs by the 
farming community. Simply put, if such crops are to fulfil 
the dramatically expanded role envisaged by policy makers, 
large numbers of farmers will need to plant them. But 
because very few British farmers have any experience of 
PECs, most are wary of them (Sherrington and Moran, 2010; 
Convery et al., 2012), and this may help to explain the stark 
contrast between the official optimism about energy crops 
and the limited area planted to date: by 2011, the total area 
established in the entire UK was just 0.01 Mha (DfT/DECC/
DEFRA, 2012). This ‘implementation gap’ is one of the 
issues addressed in this case study.
The zone targeted for PEC expansion by policy makers is 
land which can be described as the ‘squeezed middle’ – not 
top quality agricultural land which is protected for arable 
cropping, nor poor, exposed upland areas, but intermediate 
quality farmland, sometimes referred to as ‘marginal land’ 
in this context (Shortall, 2013). It is dubbed the ‘squeezed 
middle’ because this zone is simultaneously targeted by 
several policy objectives (including forestry expansion, public 
access, renewable energy and conservation), and this area 
cannot fully accommodate all these diverse ambitions. The 
Scottish Government’s innovative Land Use Strategy (LUS) is 
an attempt to provide a ‘strategy of strategies’ to chart a way 
through such tensions by facilitating holistic land use decision 
making. Launched in 2011, the LUS sets out a framework 
and broad principles for reconciling the many competing 
demands on land, utilising the familiar ‘three pillars’ framing 
of sustainable development (Scottish Government, 2012). It is 
too soon to know how effective it will be.
The dominant land uses in south-west Scotland at 
present are dairy farming and forestry, but the region’s 
soils and climate offer significant biophysical potential for 
PECs, especially for willow grown in short rotation coppice 
(SRC). This was a key reason why the energy company 
E.ON decided to build a 44MW CHP biomass power station 
at Lockerbie in the Dumfries & Galloway region, the UK’s 
first biomass power station. Commissioned in 2009 and 
costing £90m (c. €104.4m), it requires 480,000 tonnes of 
wood fuel per annum (E.ON, 2012). The company’s stated 
aim at the outset was to source 20% of this total from 
willow grown by farmers within a 60-mile (c. 97 km) radius, 
requiring the establishment of some 4,000 ha of SRC. 
Because this represented a potentially valuable alternative 
market for the region’s farmers at a time of economic 
volatility, offering an opportunity for diversification and a 
secure local market, E.ON’s assumption was that many local 
farmers would plant SRC willow to supply the Lockerbie 
plant. The case study tested this assumption by investigating 
farmers’ attitudes to willow SRC via questionnaire surveys 
in 2009 and 2011 (n = 218).
From previous studies, there were several reasons to 
suspect that E.ON’s assumption was flawed:
•	 PECs involve cultivation techniques with which farmers 
are unfamiliar, involving new skills and different 
machinery;
•	 energy crops present farmers with new risks and 
uncertainties (e.g. a multi-year time frame which limits 
business flexibility); 
•	 in contrast to much of mainland Europe, a deep and 
long-established cultural ‘apartheid’ separates farming 
and forestry in Scotland (Morgan-Davies et al., 2003), 
and this may prejudice farmers against perennial woody 
species; and
•	 PECs are situated in a policy context which is alien to 
most farmers, sitting outside the ‘food and farming box’ 
at the interface between policies concerning climate 
change, energy security and food security (Sherrington 
and Moran, 2010).
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The methodology and the results of the study are presented 
and discussed in full by Warren et al. (2015). Only the key 
results are presented here, focusing on those which illustrate 
and exemplify the themes in the discussion which follows.  
The primary, overarching finding is that most farmers are 
strongly negative towards converting their land to SRC. The 
three most frequently stated reasons for their opposition are 
that SRC:
•	 is not suitable for existing farming practices and/or for 
the land (33%);
•	 introduces inflexibility (18%); and
•	 is associated with price uncertainty (13%).
To explore the influence of economic factors on attitudes, 
farmers were presented with a pair of hypothetical questions 
about the profitability of SRC willow:
1. Would you consider growing willow if profit margins 
were equivalent to existing operations? 
2. Would you consider growing willow if it offered greater 
profits than current practices?
Only 4% answered ‘yes’ to the first question. Unsurprisingly, 
the prospect of increased profits generated a more positive 
response to the second question, but still 40% answered ‘no’ 
and just 21% were potentially interested. When farmers were 
asked to identify a single factor which might persuade them 
to establish SRC, the two equal highest scoring factors, both 
with 32%, were ‘profitability’ and ‘nothing’; thus for almost 
a third of respondents, no foreseeable factor would persuade 
them to consider planting willow on their farms.
It was apparent from the nature of the responses that 
antipathy to SRC was closely linked with farmers’ self-
identity and with a strong attachment to their way of life. 
The following selection of statements by respondent farmers 
concerning their attitudes towards short rotation coppice 
and the proposal that they might establish SRC on their 
farms, exemplify this association:
• “[SRC] is useless! Our job is producing food, not fuel.”
• “It [growing SRC] is not what we do. We produce FOOD!”
• “We would never grow energy crops. [Dairy farming] is a 
way of life, our way of life.”
• “We are livestock farmers, not tree farmers.”
• “No amount of money would ever encourage me to grow 
willow because I am a farmer!”
Some clear conclusions emerge from the data. Firstly, 
despite a reliable local market (the E.ON power station), 
SRC is perceived as an ‘alien’ threat to farmers’ socio-
cultural identity and way of life. Secondly, there is a serious 
disconnect between the goals of policy-makers and the 
perceptions of farmers who are at the ‘sharp end’ of policy 
delivery. As one farmer put it, “some suit-wearing office boy 
must have thought that the hill-billy farmers of south-west 
Scotland would just subside, sell half their herds and plant 
willow.” Thirdly, and more generally, if these results are 
representative, they imply that energy crops are unlikely to 
become a significant part of the renewable energy transition 
in the UK uplands in the way that policies and official 
projections envisage.
3. Mismatches and disconnects shaping 
energy landscapes
The above findings are now used to illustrate a broader 
discussion of different scales and types of disconnection, 
and to explore some of the ways in which these mismatches 
can shape the geographies of emerging energy landscapes. 
The networked nature of energy systems produces 
geographies of connection, notably in very material ways 
(e.g. the spatial forms of electricity grids and their temporal 
evolution). By contrast, the focus here is on geographies of 
disconnection. While these disconnects are, in themselves, 
mostly immaterial, they have very tangible implications for 
landscapes and society.
3.1 Socio-political and socio-cultural disconnects
This sub-section highlights the disconnections between 
policy makers and stakeholders. Such stakeholders may 
be active (i.e. people who are expected to implement policy, 
such as the farmers in the above study), or passive, such as 
communities which are asked or forced to ‘host’ developments 
in their ‘backyard’. A disconnect between stakeholders 
and policy makers is strikingly apparent in the Lockerbie 
results. These findings, when combined with other studies of 
farmers’ responses to government policy initiatives, and also 
with research on the social acceptability of wind power, show 
that technocrats ignore socio-cultural realities at their peril 
(Burton et al., 2008; Greiner and Gregg, 2011; Convery et 
al., 2012; Huber et al., 2012). Policy makers in the UK and 
elsewhere have often been perplexed to discover that technical 
assessments identifying suitable sites do not translate either 
simply or easily into renewable energy projects. All too 
often, only lip service is paid to the social science dimensions 
of energy debates, and yet these frequently turn out to be 
critical. Policy making and policy implementation require an 
understanding of the ‘full geography’.
In itself, this is hardly a new insight. Over two decades 
ago, Twidell and Brice (1992, p. 477) noted that “limits 
to renewable resources are not the potential in the 
environment, but the institutional factors and collective 
personal response of the public”, and this observation has 
been repeatedly proved by subsequent experience. Because 
it is a truth which is continually overlooked and contributes 
to the common phenomenon of policy ‘implementation 
gaps’, however, it remains an important live issue to 
highlight. It is also a contributory factor in the so-called 
‘social gap’ between broad public support for a policy and 
public opposition to specific proposals, a much-researched 
issue which has recently been revisited by Bell et al. (2013). 
They argue that understanding such gaps is important not 
only for the fulfillment of renewable energy ambitions but, 
more broadly, to explicate “the relationship between public 
opinion and political outcomes in democratic politics more 
generally” (Bell et al., 2013, p. 116). The importance of the 
social science dimensions of policy implementation is also 
stressed by Warren et al. (2012), who suggest that, whereas 
the sustainability challenge was once thought to consist of 
persuading a soft and malleable society to adjust to ‘hard 
facts’, it would now appear that the inverse situation of 
‘soft facts’ and ‘hard society’ is perhaps closer to the truth: 
facts are contested, whereas social norms and practices 
prove resistant to change. The story of the development of 
wind power policy nicely exemplifies this inversion (Szarka 
et al., 2012), as does the resistance of Lockerbie farmers 
to PECs despite the existence of positive economic and 
technical ‘facts’.
Thus, socio-political and socio-cultural disconnects can 
powerfully shape energy geographies by ‘frustrating’ energy 
policy. The way that this emerges in the Lockerbie study 
is characterised by Warren et al. (2015) as constituting a 
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disconnect between ‘suits and boilersuits’ (boilersuits being 
work clothing worn by many farmers); in other words, a 
perceptual gulf separates the policy makers from the ‘ground 
level’ actors with responsibility for implementing policy. 
Quotes such as the one above about ‘some suit-wearing office 
boy…’ show that the farmers themselves are keenly aware of 
this disconnect. Official projections by ‘the suits’ envisage a 
major expansion of PECs, yet take-up by ‘the boilersuits’ has 
been minimal. This policy failure can partly be understood as 
a lack of understanding by policy makers of the values and 
goals of ‘policy deliverers’. This links with the idea of ‘place 
attachment’ discussed below.
The gulf that this failure creates is, regrettably, all 
too common. For example, attitudes strikingly similar to 
those held by farmers around Lockerbie are documented 
amongst Australian farmers by Hall et al. (2013, p. 205), 
one of whom they report as saying: “We should decide what 
happens. We don’t want city slickers coming down and 
telling us what’s what”. There are also strong parallels here 
with the well-documented disconnect that exists between 
agri-environmental policies and farmers’ values and 
motivations (Burton et al., 2008; Greiner and Gregg, 2011). 
This literature highlights the fact that land use managers 
“stand at the point where abstract policy imperatives collide 
with concrete realities” (Constable, 2012, p. xi). Landscape 
change is, in practice, the product of myriad local decisions 
made by individual stakeholders. As Cope et al. (2011, p. 855) 
observe, policy makers “typically focus on biophysical and 
economic criteria that influence farmers’ land use decisions 
at the expense of ‘intrinsic’ socio-cultural motivations”. This 
further emphasises the point that understanding these socio-
cultural dimensions of decision making and policy adoption 
is critical if the socio-political gulf and the ‘implementation 
gap’ are to be bridged.
3.2 Scalar disconnects: temporal and spatial mismatches
A number of significant disconnects are scalar in nature 
(at both spatial scale and temporal scale), and here we are in 
quintessentially geographical terrain. As Bridge et al. (2013, 
pp. 332–333) observe: “The goal of a low carbon transition… 
is slowly emerging as a question of which geographical 
futures will be created… Meeting the challenges of climate 
change and energy security is, therefore, fundamentally a 
geographical project.”
The temporal dimension has received significant 
attention via the concept of ‘the energy transition’ itself, 
whereas the ways that spatial processes influence energy 
systems have been studied less.  These interlocking scalar 
issues can be introduced via the simple graphic in Figure 1, 
which shows a three-dimensional ‘decision space’ with 
priority axes. This illustrates the potential for scale-related 
disconnects to arise. Whether a particular strategy or policy 
is judged to be good or bad will depend – amongst many 
other factors – on the different priorities attached to the 
various dimensions of this decision-making matrix. Debates 
surrounding energy futures have repeatedly revealed the 
differential weightings attached by diverse protagonists 
to (i) present concerns versus those of our descendants, 
(ii) local versus international perspectives, and (iii) the 
importance of human concerns versus the value of non-
human nature. For example, to risk adopting stereotypes, 
members of rural communities might give high priority 
to the present concerns of local people (Point A in Fig. 1), 
while members of international conservation organisations 
might situate themselves at the other end of all three 
axes (Point B) by emphasising the long-term significance 
of natural systems from a global perspective. Tensions 
flowing from different spatial and temporal priorities lie at 
the heart of many energy controversies (Pillai et al., 2005; 
Szarka et al., 2012). Judgements about these priorities 
are themselves formed in diverse and contested ways, 
depending on people’s beliefs and value systems, their 
political outlook, and, for example, the importance they 
attach to scientific approaches as opposed to other grounds 
of knowledge and decision making.
There are several mismatches to highlight here. The first, 
already alluded to, is the familiar tension between local and 
global. Arguments supporting renewables often rest on global 
and national concerns such as climate change and energy 
security, whereas the arguments of opponents typically focus 
on the specificities of local places and landscapes (Warren 
and Birnie, 2009). Conflict is exacerbated by the contrast 
between the seemingly abstract, invisible, diffuse benefits of 
the energy transition and the highly tangible local impacts 
of, for example, PECs, wind turbines or grid upgrades. The 
perception that the global environment is being saved by 
sacrificing the local environment fuels opposition.
The second mismatch is that between the rapid pace of 
change (in energy technologies and energy landscapes) and 
the slow rate at which public attitudes evolve, especially in 
relation to landscape aesthetics. Throughout history, the 
changing energy needs and choices of society have frequently 
been major drivers of landscape change, from prehistoric 
tree felling for fuel, to coal mining, hydropower dams and 
electrification. During the ongoing transition to renewables, 
energy has again emerged as a significant agent of landscape 
change (Nadai and van der Horst, 2010), notably through the 
construction of windfarms, solar farms and the associated 
upgrades of electricity grids, and these are set to rival or 
exceed the landscape impacts of previous energy technologies. 
Although social norms concerning landscape aesthetics do 
evolve, often quite radically, such changes typically take place 
slowly, over generations. The sharp dichotomy between the 
urgency of the need for an energy transition and the slow rate 
at which public attitudes towards landscape aesthetics evolve 
is explored insightfully by Selman (2010). For many people, 
the “energy transition is experienced as the transformation 
of landscape” (Bridge et al., 2013, p. 335) – often swift and 
dramatic in the case of modern windfarms - and the speed, 
Fig. 1: Priority axes in environmental decision-making. 
(See text for explanation: after Warren, 2009)
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magnitude and nature of change is far greater than the pace 
of aesthetic adaptation will enable many people to accept. It 
is akin to ‘future shock’. Landscape concerns often feature 
prominently in debates over renewable energy proposals, 
as revealed tellingly in the names of anti-windfarm groups 
such as Australia’s ‘Landscape Guardians’ and England’s 
‘Country Guardians’. Although history and some recent 
evidence suggests that society may eventually “learn to love 
the landscapes of carbon neutrality”, and that an “acquired 
aesthetic” could develop concerning renewables technologies, 
this may take a generation or more because “the social 
production of taste associated with landscape is quite slow, 
and preferences tend to be conservative, generally making it 
difficult for us to accept change” (Selman, 2010, pp. 157, 160). 
In the meantime, this mismatch will continue to act as a social 
brake on the implementation of renewable energy policy. It is 
clear, for example, that farmers in the Lockerbie region are 
not minded to embrace PECs either quickly or easily.
A third mismatch comprises a socio-psychological 
disconnect in the way that locations are socially constructed 
- a mismatch between ‘sites’ and ‘places’. In the context 
of renewable energy, this has been revealingly explored by 
Devine-Wright (2009, 2011). It comprises a conflict between 
the top-down perspectives of politicians, planners and 
developers, and the perceptions of local residents. The former 
typically conceptualise locations which have development 
potential (whether for energy crops, wind power or other 
renewable energy technologies) as impersonal ‘sites’, 
whereas the latter tend to see and relate to them as ‘places’ 
which are imbued with symbolic and emotional meaning. 
Local opposition to renewable energy proposals has been 
shown to be strongly linked to ‘place attachment’ (a concept 
closely allied with the geographical idea of topophilia 
(Tuan, 1990) and to the mobilisation of ‘place protectors’ 
(Devine-Wright, 2009; Bell et al., 2013). In other words, 
opposition is not simply a defence of landscape aesthetics, 
but of places from which individuals and local communities 
derive meaning, value and identity. So the scale dimension 
here is constructed by and operates through the perceptions 
of the actors involved. This disconnect is well illustrated 
by the Lockerbie results which show that farmers perceive 
PECs as incompatible with – and even a threat to – their 
identity and way of life. Their opposition to PECs is clearly 
motivated by the contrast between, on the one hand, the 
policy makers’ detached, homogenising construction of 
‘intermediate land’ as an ideal site for bioenergy production 
and, on the other, the farmers’ own intimate understanding 
of the specificities of that land as a valued local place.
A fourth and final mismatch simply comprises a 
straightforward clash in scales between the large size of 
some renewable energy technologies (notably modern 
wind turbines) and the scale of the components of many 
rural landscapes – both natural (topography, trees) and 
cultural (field boundaries, buildings and settlements). 
Rapid technological development in pursuit of ever greater 
efficiencies, resulting in today’s giant turbines, has meant 
that the technology has progressively outgrown the 
landscape and no longer fits comfortably within it. The 
industrial scale of modern turbines, and their out-of-scale 
dominance in the landscape, is frequently cited by opponents 
as a factor motivating their opposition. Scale is “one of the 
main controversial dimensions” because contemporary 
installations “ignore the principles of harmony and fitness” 
(Selman, 2010, p. 165). The impressive gains in efficiency 
have come at the cost of ever greater aesthetic intrusiveness 
as they have grown to dwarf their surroundings, becoming 
visible from great distances. To a lesser extent, this applies 
to PECs too; even though such crops are, in themselves, both 
natural and relatively small in scale, the policy aspirations 
for their widespread adoption represent a potentially 
large-scale transformation of the countryside, possibly 
the greatest change in British land use since the mid-20th 
century (Coleby et al., 2012).
3.3 Scale meets socio-politics
The above two groups of issues intersect and combine 
to create complex, many-layered disconnections that this 
paper can do little more than point towards, but they are 
integral to the emerging geographies of energy landscapes 
and socio-politics more generally. As shown below, while 
these disconnections stretch far beyond energy geographies 
and the energy transition per se, they are directly relevant 
to them, framing the evolving context in which energy 
decisions are made. Two examples of this multi-faceted 
and intricately woven terrain may suffice. Both are 
familiar examples which are used here to illustrate how 
geographical perspectives can enhance our understanding 
of the challenges of negotiating the energy transition, and 
how scaling, as an analytical lens, can illuminate significant 
aspects of energy geographies (Bridge et al., 2013). This 
final section, of necessity, leaves behind the regional case 
study of farmers’ attitudes to PECs which has exemplified 
the above discussion, because the issues are broader in scope 
and more conceptual in nature.
The first example is the frequently noted and sharp 
discontinuity between the short time-scales of politics and 
the much greater temporal scales not only of climatic and 
environmental change, but also of the time that it will take 
for the energy transition to run its full course. Proverbially, 
‘a week is a long time in politics’. The time horizons in 
most democratic systems rarely stretch beyond a few years 
at best, and frequently decisions are taken on the basis of 
much shorter-term considerations. A policy which will yield 
no political dividends before the next election – indeed, 
which may only have measurable benefits over time-scales of 
decades or centuries - has limited political traction, and yet, 
compounding the difficulty, the costs of mitigation policies 
and strategies are borne in the present (Edmondson and 
Levy, 2013). This important “mismatch between the scales at 
which natural and human systems organize” is profoundly 
counter-productive, because it leads to these kinds of 
“failures in feedback when… benefits accrue at one scale, but 
costs are carried at another” (Carpenter et al., 2006, p. 257). 
One response to this problem has been the promotion of 
the concept of ‘the Long Now’ (Robin and Steffen, 2007). A 
damaging consequence of this disconnect is that short-term 
criteria predominate in much political decision making. 
Ineluctably, this downgrades the priority of long-term 
issues – such as climate change, landscape evolution and the 
ultimate goals of the energy transition – in turn rendering 
policy making for ‘the Long Now’ an intractable political 
challenge within democratic systems. Even though policy 
making for climate change mitigation and renewable energy 
development stand out as exceptions in this regard, in that 
some governments have set legally-binding targets over time 
periods spanning several electoral cycles, this is still a much 
shorter time frame than the time-scale of the issues that 
such policies purport to address.
The second example is the mismatch between the spatial 
scale of the politics of nation states and the global scale of 
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many energy and climate-related issues. Nation states are 
well-practised in the art of governance at national, regional 
and local scales, but cannot, acting alone, tackle supra-
national phenomena. Yet many of the most urgent challenges 
are now global in scope. This is because, since the mid-20th 
century, the rapidly globalising world has become ever-more 
intricately and deeply interconnected (especially in terms 
of economics, communications, health and environmental 
governance), and because exponentially increasing human 
impacts have inaugurated the so-called Anthropocene era of 
human dominance (Steffen et al., 2007). The swift dawning 
of today’s hyper-connected age, in which the “knock-ons” 
of local events can rapidly cascade globally (e.g. ‘9/11’; 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers), has given ever-greater 
prominence to global governance arrangements. In an 
insightful discussion of this trend, Hale and Held (2013, 
pp. 20, 23) reflect on Lorenzetti’s famous 14th century 
fresco The Allegory of Good and Bad Government, depicting 
medieval city states, to highlight the transformation in scales 
of governance: “The scale at which political institutions must 
be effective has expanded beyond cities and their surrounding 
fields to include countries, continents and, with globalisation, 
the world as a whole… Human activities anywhere on the 
planet now affect the climate in which every other person on 
the planet and their descendants must live.”
They show how, just as the success of medieval city states 
set in motion changes which rendered them obsolete, so the 
success of nation states has unleashed forces at supra-national 
scales which they are ill-equipped to address. In the words of 
Goldin (2013, p. 48): “the challenges of the global commons 
increasingly render domestic solutions inadequate”.
Growing recognition of these and other scalar mismatches, 
and of the ineffectiveness of the international community’s 
response to many critical global challenges, has led some 
to question whether our political systems and institutions 
are ‘fit for purpose’ for governance of the global village 
(Goldin, 2013). An increasing number of those who investigate 
this question are coming to the conclusion that they are not. 
For example, the verdicts of Shearman and Smith (2007) 
and Edmondson and Levy (2013) are encapsulated in the 
arresting titles of their respective books: The Climate Change 
Challenge and the Failure of Democracy, and Climate Change 
and Order: the end of prosperity and democracy. These authors 
argue that liberal democracy and the current consensus-
building approach to international relations are incapable of 
delivering the swift and effective action required to decrease 
rates of greenhouse gas emissions, not least through the 
decarbonisation of the energy sector; they even go so far as to 
suggest that they are responsible for global climate change. 
Thus Shearman and Smith (2007, p. 11) contend that “liberal 
democracy is ecologically flawed as a social system because 
it leads to the tragedy of the commons”. In a similar vein, 
Wainwright and Mann (2012, p. 9) argue trenchantly in their 
paper Climate Leviathan that “if climate science is even half 
right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy… is at 
best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction”.
These publications go on to construct a critique of 
economic growth, the fundamental engine of capitalism, 
and argue that achieving ‘prosperity without growth’ 
(Jackson, 2011) should instead be the over-riding goal. 
For, as the UNDP (2008, p. 27) recognises, climate change 
demonstrates clearly that “economic wealth creation is not 
the same as human progress”. In the Anthropocene era, 
Gross Domestic Product is a narrow, inadequate yardstick 
of success (Robinson, 2012). Considerations of this kind 
lead to suggestions that new political visions and economic 
systems are needed to support viable futures (Edmondson 
and Levy, 2013). Such arguments, informed by a recognition 
of the temporal and spatial mismatches identified above, are 
resulting in a hard-nosed reassessment of the value and likely 
ability of today’s democratic governance structures to address 
worldwide challenges in a timely and effective fashion. In the 
view of Hale and Held (2013, p. 20), “global governance has 
become gridlocked [and]… the multilateral institutions we 
rely on to solve global problems are increasingly unable to 
do so”. Both Goldin (2013) and Hale et al. (2013) show that 
institutionalised multilateral cooperation is failing at a time 
when the need for it has never been greater.
This “yawning governance gap” (Goldin, 2013, p. 3) is 
apparent in many spheres, but the example that is of most 
direct and pressing relevance for energy geographies is the 
continuing failure of global climate negotiations to deliver an 
effective global treaty. The gap in this arena is particularly 
stark. Widespread and growing disillusionment with the 
negotiation process, especially since the Cancún climate 
talks of 2010, is prompting a reversion to smaller-scale, more 
localised responses to the many challenges posed by climate 
change, including the energy transition and its landscape 
implications (New Scientist, 2013). As the prospect of 
agreeing to binding targets at the global scale has receded, 
so regional and municipal governments have increasingly 
opted to ‘go it alone’ - to give up waiting for top-down, 
multilateral solutions, and to set their own local targets and 
policies unilaterally. This is strikingly true at the city scale 
(Bulkeley and Broto, 2013).  Recent statistics suggest that 
this trend of relocalisation is helping to decouple economic 
growth from emissions through reductions in carbon 
intensity (Pearce, 2013). Positive though this trend is, it is 
not a substitute for global agreements.
It is apparent even from this short discussion that any 
consideration of the disconnects and mismatches identified 
above swiftly leads to much broader and searching questions 
about governance, ultimate socio-economic goals, the 
sovereignty of nation states and the efficacy of liberal 
democracy, questions which far exceed the scope of this 
paper.  Such destabilising and unpalatable challenges to the 
status quo are, unsurprisingly, gaining little public airing as 
yet: “the prospect that core political values are challenged 
as a result of global climate change impacts is a dawning 
realisation that few political actors readily accept and 
acknowledge” (Edmondson and Levy, 2013, p. 4). Unwelcome 
though this realisation is, it is nevertheless quite clear that 
the issues raised by the urgent need for an energy transition – 
as part of an effective response to global climate change – are 
unleashing questions which go far beyond energy geographies 
to challenge fundamental, normative assumptions about the 
structure and functioning of society. The ways in which these 
questions are addressed – or ignored – in the coming decades, 
will set the context in which energy geographies and energy 
landscapes develop.
4. Conclusion
A case study of the attitudes of farmers in south-west 
Scotland to the adoption of perennial energy crops has 
shown that, despite the area’s technical potential for such 
crops and the existence of a local market, most farmers 
are strongly opposed to planting them. The findings of this 
case study have served to illustrate a range of mismatches 
and disconnects – socio-political, cultural, psychological 
and scalar – which can act as significant hindrances to the 
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delivery of renewable energy policies, in turn influencing 
energy landscapes.  These then feed into a set of high-level 
questions and challenges concerning modes and scales of 
governance, questions which are becoming more pressing in 
the context of global climate change and consequent efforts 
to reduce emissions from the energy sector.
Society’s energy choices have always shaped landscapes, 
and there can be no doubt that “energy will be a driving force 
of future cultural landscapes” (Selman, 2010, p. 169). But it 
is striking that, through the link with climate change, the 
scale at which society’s use of energy moulds landscapes has 
recently leapt from local to global: our energy choices now 
have planetary reach. Reciprocally, that spatial leap has also 
operated in reverse, as global concerns have increasingly come 
to influence local decisions – householders install low-energy 
light bulbs to save the planet, and local mayors wrestle with 
the carbon cycle.  In energy geographies, as in so many other 
arenas, globalisation has blurred the boundaries between 
domestic and international issues (Hale and Held, 2013). As 
the simple graphic in Figure 1 above, illustrates, the sliding 
scales of spatial and temporal concerns create the scope 
for an almost infinite number of different but justifiable 
positions. For this reason alone (and there are many others), 
energy decisions are always likely to generate sharp debate.
The various mismatches and disconnections discussed in 
this paper play an important role in shaping energy landscapes 
by influencing both the nature and rate of change. It is clear 
that the ‘disconnections’ are not only figurative but also 
literal, and that the former affect the latter: disconnections 
postpone connections. In other words, the failure of policy 
makers to ‘connect’ effectively with stakeholders delays 
the creation of actual physical electrical connections with 
renewable sources of power, thereby impeding the transition 
to a renewables-based energy sector. The way that these 
mismatches and disconnects are negotiated will mould both 
the character of future energy landscapes and the speed at 
which they take shape.
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